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The  Individud  Wclfarc  Function  (IWF).  introduced  hy  Van  Praap  ( IYhR).  is  a  c;lrdinal  utility 
function.  It  can  he  mc;lsured  hy  me;ms  of  survey  qucslions.  Since  its  intrcducti<w.  the  IWF  has 
hwn  used cxtcnsively  in  both  thcwcticd  and  cmpiricnl  rcxcarch.  Thik  rwxrch  is revicwcd.  with  an 
emphasis  on  policy  :Ipplic;ltions. 
Since:  the  days  of  Edgeworth,  who  allcgcdly  consiclcrecl  utility  to  bc  ‘as 
real  as  his  morning  jam’  (Samuclson  1945:  206).  utility  theory  has 
grown  into  a  highly  abstract  field  of  rcscarch  in  economics.  In  the 
course  of  this  dcvdopmcnt.  the  focus  of  attention  has  shifted  from 
utility  functions  per  sc  to  the  representation  of  the  unckrlying  prefer- 
ences.  Since,  usually  a  preference:  ordering  can  bc  represented  by  more 
than  just  one  utility  function,  the  empirical  status  of  the  concept  has 
erodtxl  dramatically. 
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as  representations  of  preference  orderings  complicates  measurement  in 
that  measurement  takes  place  indirecr!r*  via  the  revealed  preference 
approach.  Secondly,  the  assumed  non-cardinality  and  non-interpersonal 
comparability  of  utility  functions  limits  their  applicability  in  policy 
matters.  It  is now  generally  accepted  that  for  purposes  of  social  policy  a 
certain  amount  of  interpersonal  comparability  is indispensable,  cf.,  e.g.. 
Sen  (1974). 
Presumably.  the  early  writers  were  a  little  overconfident  regarding 
the  intersubjective  nature  and  measurability  of  utility  functions.  But. 
one  wonders  whether  modern  economists’  retreat  to  an  almost  agnostic 
position  has  really  been  forced  upon  them  by  outcomes  of  empirical 
observations.  or  whether  to  some  extent  the  restraint  is  selfimposed. 
For  example,  in  a  static  setting  (under  conditions  of  perfect  informa- 
tion.  etc.)  indifference  curves,  and  hence  ordinal  utility,  are  sufficient  to 
explain  choice  behavior.  This  obviates  the  assumption  of  cardinal  utility 
and.  invoking  Occam’s  razor,  it  has  been  dropped.  In  this  process 
cwrpirictrl  ot~.y(‘ri’(IIiotIs pltrb- 110 t-ok.  In  fact.  one  can  easily  think  of 
empirical  evidcncc  that  would  support  cardinality,  like  individuals 
being  ahlc  to  order  utility  diffcrcnccs.  For  example:  a11  individual  may 
bc  ahlc  to  state  that  a  move  from  one  sandwich  to  t\vo  sandwiches  adds 
more  utility  than  ;I  IIIOVC  from  two  to  three.  It  is  well-known  that  in 
such  ;I  GISC  prcfcrcnccs  have  to  bc  dcscribcd  by  a  cardinal  utility 
function  (c.g.,  Fishburn  1970:  ch.  6). 
If  it  is  true  that  economists’  rctrcat  from  mcasurablc  cardinal  utility 
is  not  basccl  on  convincing  empirical  cvidcnce.  but  on  ;I  desire  to 
cconomizc  011  assumptions,  thL’  question  iIrkS  whether  something  hiIS 
been  lost  by  givin g  LIP  the  possibility  of  ;I  cardinally  measurable  utility 
function.  Arc  thcrc  empirical  or  theoretical  problems  that  can  not  (or 
only  with  considerably  more  difficulty)  be  tackled  without  a  cardinally 
measurable  utility  concept‘  ?  If  the  ansiver  to  this  question  is  in  the 
affirmative  WC:  AlSO  hilVt2  tO’filCl2  ttlC  question  to  Wllilt  eXtCIlt  cardiniility 
is ;I testable  assumption. 
In  this  article  we  consider  these  questions  by  reviewing  results 
regarding  a  cardinal  utility  concept  that  has  been  subject  to  research 
over  the  last  fifteen  years  or  so.  This  utility  function  is  the  so-called 
ltuiir~ichrtrl  CVd/rrrc~  Fumtiotl  (I WF).  which  was  introduced  by  Van  Praag 
(1968).  Since  its  inception.  the  concept  has  been  applied  and  extended 
in  various  directions.  An  earlier  review  of  results  is given  by  Van  Praag (1976).  Much  of  the  work  on  the  concept  of  the  IWF  has  a  direct 
bearing  on  economic  theory  and  on  socio-economic  policy.  In  our 
review  we  will  pay  special  attention  lo  its  potential  for  policy  analysis. 
Since  both  authors  of  this  paper  have  devoted  a  fair  amount  of  their 
time  to  research  involving  IWFs.  the  reader  should  be  warned  that  our 
discussion  will  presumably  be  biased  in  its  favor.  Furthermore.  the  vast 
majority  of  papers  reviewed  here  has  been  written  by  a small  number  of 
researchers.  To  contain  the  length  of  the  review  within  reasonable 
bounds.  we  do  not  try  to  discuss  in  any  detail  related  research  by  others 
-  we  trust  that  that  has  been  done  sufficiently  in  the  papers  referred  to. 
In  essence,  our  review  is a plea  to  enhance  the  empirical  status  of  utility 
theory.  without  necessarily  going  all  the  way  back  to  the  morning  jam. 
There  are  a  number  of  outstanding  features  of  the  IWF  that  will  be 
discussed  consecutively: 
(1)  The  IWF  is a  cardinal  utility  function.  with  function  values  ranging 
from  zero  (worst  case)  to  one  (best  case).  Under  certain  assumptions 
its  functional  form  can  be  derived.  In  section  2  the  functional  form 
is discussed,  whereas  scclion  3 gives  an  inlerprclalion  of  its  paramc- 
tcrs.  There  arc  different  types  of  IWFs  and  these  are  also  discussed. 
(2)  IWFs  differ  bctwcen  individuals  and  can  hc  mcasurcd  by  means  of 
survey  questions.  The  mcasuremcnt  method  is introduced  in  section 
4.  Tests  of  cardinality  and  functional  form  arc  rcportcd. 
(3)  Thcrc  is a  simpk  theory  cxplainin,  17  why  and  how  individual  wclfarc 
functions  differ  bctw~cn  individuals.  This  ‘theory  of  prefcrcncc 
formation’  is  cxplaincd  in  scclion  5  and  furlhcr  cliscusscd  in 
section  6. 
After  this  exposition  of  the  basic  fcaturcs  H’C  discuss  empirical  evidcncc 
regarding  the  prefercncc  formation  theory  and  mention  various  :ipplica- 
lions  and  implications  in  sections  7.  8  and  9.  The  applications  include 
the  construction  of  family  eyuivalencc  scales  and  poverty  lines  and  an 
analysis  of  the  welfare  effects  of  economic  growth  and  income  redistri- 
bution.  Section  10 concludes. 
2.  The  indiviclunl  welf;rre  function 
The  individual  welfare  function  is  the  outcome  of  a  rather  elaborate 
theoretical  structure.  To  keep  our  exposition  simple.  we  only  give  a brief  sketch  of  the  underlying  theory,  omitting  as  many  details  as 
possible.  For  the  latter,  the  reader  is referred  to  Van  Praag  (1968,  1975). 
A  central  role  in  the  theory  is  played  by  the  notion  of  a  commodity 
group.  A commodity  group  is a  set  of  one  or  more  commodities  that.  in 
any  combination  of  quantities,  can  be  represented  by  the  same  (finite  or 
infinite)  set  of  characteristics  (cf.  Gorman  1956,  Lancaster  1971).  The 
number  of  commodity  groups  that  one  can  distinguish  obviously  de- 
pends  on  the  way  consumers  define  characteristics.  A  large  part  of  Van 
Praag’s  theory  is concerned  with  psychological  assumptions  on  the  way 
people  define  characteristics  and  how  characteristics  enter  the  utility 
function.  The  set-up  chosen  is  one  in  which  utility  theory  becomes 
formdiy  isomorphic  wirh probability  theory.  The  isomorphism  is used  to 
apply  the  Central  Limit  Theorem  from  probability  theory  to  utility 
theory.  The  Central  Limit  Theorem  comes  in  when  considering  com- 
modity  groups  that  are  two&,  i.e..  that  are  described  by  a  large  number 
of  characteristics.  The  bare  essentials  of  Van  Praag’s  theory  can  be 
sketched  as  follows. 
Consider  a  commodity  group  represented  by  II  characteristics.  The 
wcIfare  that  a  consumer  derives  from  a  particular  combination  of 
characteristics  s,.  . . . . s,,  is dcnotcd  as  Cl/(x,,  . . . , x,,),  i.e.,  W  is a  utility 
function  defined  on  characteristics.  Regarding  the  utility  function  W, 
Van  Praag  assumes  that  it  has  the  same  mathematical  properties  as  a 
probability  distribution  function  (it  assumes  values  between  zero  and 
01x.  it  is  non-dccrcasing  in  each  s,,  etc.)  and  that  it  has  the  following 
scparahIc  structure: 
W/(X,,.. .d=  ~~,(.~,)~WZ(X~)...C~,(S,,). 
whcrc  W, rcprcscnts  the  utility  attached  to  x,.  Thus  the  welfare  derived 
from  the  combination  (x,,  . . . , A-,,)  is  the  product  of  the  amounts  of 
welfare  that  each  characteristic  provides  separately.  In  standard  eco- 
nomic  theory,  Cf/  would  be  considered  to  be  orditd.  so  that  for 
example  W could  be  replaced  by  In W,  because  W  and  lnCV imply  the 
same  orderirzg  of  combinations  of  characteristics.  If  we  take  logarithms 
on  both  sides  of  (1).  the  right  hand  side  becomes  a  sum  of  the  Iny.  In 
terms  of  conventional  economic  theory  we  would  then  say  that  the 
utility  function  W  is  ddirilv,  an  assumption  which  is  often  made.  In 
Van  Praag’s  theory  such  a  transformation  is not  permitted,  i.e.,  he  takes 
CV to  be  a  curdimrl  concept. In  order  to  be  able  to  consume  a  certain  combination  of  characteris- 
tics  _x,. . . . , x,  the  consumer  has  to  spend  money  on  the  commodity 
groups.  Conversely,  given  that  he  [l]  is  willing  to  spend  a  certain 
amount  y  on  the  commodity  group,  there  are  probably  many  different 
combinations  of  characteristics  that  he  can  acquire.  Which  combina- 
tions  these  are  depends  on  the  market.  Or  to  put  it  in  a  slightly 
different  perspective,  which  combinations  the  consumer  believes  to  be 
obtainable  by  spending  an  amount  y  depends  on  his  perception  of  the 
market  of  consumption  goods.  Van  Praag  assumes  that  the  consumer 
believes  that  by  spending  an  amount  J,  all  combinations  of  characteris- 
tics  (x,,...,  x,)  are  available  that  satisfy 
(2) 
or  equivalently, 
lnf,(_Y,)+lnf2(_r,)+  . ..+ln/.,(x,,)<ln~.  (2a) 
where  f,,  fi  ,....  f,,  are  functions  that  are  left  unspecified.  although  they 
are  assumed  to  be  continuous  and  positive-valued.  An  example  of 
inequality  (2)  is given  in  fig.  1. for  the  case  jr =  2.  Given  that  he  spends 
an  amount  y  on  the  commodity  group  under  consideration,  the  con- 
sumer  believes  that  each  point  in  the  area  under  the  curve  is attainable. 
The  form  of  the  area  depends  of  course  on  the  mathematical  form  of 
the  functions  1,  and  /?. 
The  area  under  the  curve  in  fig.  1 bears  a  close  resemblance  to  the 
concept  of  a  /~&et  ser  in  economics.  Usually,  however,  a  budget  set 
describes  a  collection  of  con~modiks  that  is available  to  the  consumer, 
rather  than  charuveristic.~  as  in  fig.  1.  Furthermore,  the  area  in  fig.  1 
only  represents  the  perce@l~  of  the  consumer  of  what  he  could  acquire 
if  he  spent  an  amount  y.  There  is  no  presumption  that  this  perception 
is correct. 
Next,  Van  Praag  considers  the  following  question.  Given  that  the 
utility  of  characteristics  is given  by  eq.  (1)  and  that  eq.  (2)  delimits  the 
combinations  of  characteristics  that  can  be  obtained  by  spending  _r, 
what  welfare  will  the  consumer  attach  to  J? 
There  are  at  least  two  plausible  answers  to  this  question.  The  first 33x 
one  is  ;I rational  one.  The  consumer  should  decide  which  point  in  the 
;trc;t  under  (hc  curve  hc  prefers.  Let  US say  that  this  is point  A  in  fig.  1. 
According  to  his  welfare  function  W, the  evaluation  (the  ‘utility’)  of  the 
combination  of  characteristics  (sr,  A-:)  is  equal  to  W(xf’,  xy)_  Given 
lhat  W  is  formally  a  probability  distribution  function  we  can  write 
(3) 
where  d W(lt,  5,)  is simply  the  (small)  increase  in  welfare  that  results  if 
we  move  from-  the  point  ({$.  12)  to  the  point  (cl  +  d{,,  l2 -t  d{,)_ 
Formally,  WC  can  identify  d W  with  a  probability  density  function.  Van 
Praag  calls  dW({,,  Tz)  the  we//k-e  ~ZUSS concentrated  in  the  point 
(11, St).  Thus,  we  can  paraphrase  (3)  by  stating  that  the  evaluation  of 
C-$.  xy),  and  hence  of  y,  is  obtained  by  integrating  the  welfare  mass 
over  the  shaded  area. There  is  a  second  plausible,  but  less  rational,  answer  to  Van  Praag’s 
question.  Since  we  are  dealing  with  the  evaluation  of  J  before  it  is 
spent.  the  consumer  considers  each  point  under  the  curve  to  be  feasible. 
And  rather  than  going  through  the  painstaking  exercise  of  having  to 
decide  what  his  preferred  point  may  be,  he  may  evaluate  J  by  identify- 
ing  it  with  the  total  welfare  mass  under  the  curve.  That  is.  the 
evaluation  of  J.  denoted  by  V(y).  is 
Eq.  (4)  represents  Van  Praag’s  preferred  answer  to  his  own  question. 
From  comparison  of  (4)  and  (3).  it  is  evident  that  (4)  represents  an 
overestimation  of  the  welfare  that  the  consumer  can  derive  from 
spending  an  amount  _Y on  the  commodity  group.  As  a  result,  actually 
spending  an  amount  _v on  the  commodity  group  will  lead  to  a  slight 
disappointment.  Although  this  incorrect  anticipation  by  the  consumer 
may  be  less  than  rational.  introspection  su,,  Ooests  that  it  is  nevertheless 
realistic. 
Notice  that  formally  V(J),  given  in  (4).  represents  the  distribution 
function  of  a  sum  of  two  random  variables  ln/,([,)  +  ln/z({2).  Also 
formally.  these  random  variahlcs  arc  independently  distrihutcd  because 
of  (I).  Gcncrally.  WC  ilrc:  dealing  with  II  of  those  variables.  Under  some 
further  technical  assumptions  and  ilssufllillg  that  I?  is  lilrgt2  (i.e.,  lhc 
commodity  group  is  broad)  we  C;III  thal  infcr  that  the  evaluation  of  In~v 
has  approximately  the  mathematical  form  of  ;I  normal  distribution. 
C’onsequcntly.  thL’  CV~llUiltiOll  of  _L’.  U(  J*).  has  approximately  the 
mathematical  form  of  a  lognormal  distribution  function.  We  write  this 
3 s 
U(Y) = N(ln_v;  p:u)  = A(y:  p, a),  (5) 
where  1y( -;  ~1, a)  is  the  normal  distribution  function  with  mean  p  and 
variance  IJ’ 9 and  A(.  ;  p,  a)  is  the  lognormal  distribution  function  with 
parameters  p  and  u.  Of  course  the  parameters  ~1 and  u  will  differ 
across  commodity  groups  and  across  individuals.  The  function  U  is 
called  the  Partid  Hfd’ure  Function  (PWF)  of  the  commodity  group 
under  consideration. 
How  broad  a  commodity  group  has  to  be  in  order  to  make  the approximation  (5)  sufficiently  close  is  an  empirical  matter.  It  appears 
from  empirical  work  (e.g..  Kapteyn  et  al.  1979,  1980)  that  durables,  like 
a  refrigerator  or  a car.  are  represented  by  a  sufficiently  large  number  of 
characteristics  to  make  the  corresponding  PWFs  approximately 
lognormal.  The  best  approximation  may  be  expected  when  we  consider 
the  broadest  possible  commodity  group,  to  wit  total  expenditures,  or, 
taking  savings  as  postponed  expenditures,  total  income.  When  y  refers 
to  income,  (5)  is  called  the  individual  Welfare  Function  of  I~tconre 
(WFI).  In  the  sequel  we  shall  often  illustrate  aspects  of  the  theory  by 
means  of  the  WFI. 
The  result  (5)  can  be  generalized  to  the  evaluation  of  money  amounts 
spent  on  a  number  of  commodity  groups  simultaneously.  A  vector 
( .I’, . . . . . y,.)  of  money  amounts  spent  on  k  broad  commodity  groups  is 
approximately  evaluated  according  to  an  k-variate  lognornal  distribu- 
tion  function. 
3.  An  interpretation  of  the  WFI  paranwters 
For  a  good  understanding  of  what  follows  it  is  useful  to  first  take  a 
closer  look  at  the  economic  and  psychological  interpretation  of  the 
tcv//u-c  pm-crrwfcrs  p  and  u  of  the  WFI.  Similar  interpretations  pertain 
to  the  parameters  of  PWFs. 
We  start  with  CL.  In  fig.  2a.  a  few  lognormal  distribution  functions 
have  hccn  drawn  for  various  values  of  p.  The  parameter  values  have 
been  taken  from  a  survey  in  The  Netherlands,  conducted  in  1975.  It 
appears  that  the  WFI  shifts  to  the  right  when  p  increases.  The  quantity 
el’  is  the  income  level  evaluated  by  0.5.  The  larger  an  individual’s  p  is, 
the  larger  the  income  is  he  needs  in  order  to  evaluate  it  by  0.5;  hence, 
e“ can  be  seen  as  a want  parameter. 
In  fig.  2b,  lognormal  distribution  functions  have  been  drawn  for 
various  values  of  u.  It can  be  seen  that  the  WFI  becomes  flatter  when  u 
increases.  The  larger  an  individual’s  u,  the  broader  the  range  of  incomes 
that  are  evaluated  substantially  different  from  zero  or  one.  If  u  is  very 
small,  the  WFI  becomes  almost  a  step  function  at  e”.  An  individual 
with  such  a  small  u  will  be  quite  happy  if  his  income  is  slightly  above 
e”  and  quite  unhappy  if  his  income  is slightly  below  e’.  Notice  that  e”, 
and  hence  ).L,  depends  on  the  unit  chosen.  whereas  u  is dimensionless. 
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Fig.  2h.  The  WFI  for  various  V~UCS of  a. 
convex  from  0  up  to  exp(p  -  o*)  and  concave  thereafter,  thus  violating 
Gossen’s  first  law  (decreasing  marginal  utility  with  increasing  income) 
for  lower  values  of  y. 
Although  Gossen’s  first  law  is often  mentioned  in  textbooks,  we  are not  aware  of  any  empirical  tests  of  it.  Of  course.  the  law  can  only  refer 
to  cardinal  utility  functions.  because  an  ordinal  utility  function  can  be 
transformed  at  will  to  make  it  concave.  Within  a  cardinal  framework, 
increasing  marginal  utility  at  the  lower  income  range  seems  quite  a 
plausible  property  for  a  utility  function  of  income.  If  income  is  below 
subsistence  level.  each  extra  dollar  brings  one  closer  to  the  point  where 
survival  is  possible  and  hence  each  extra  dollar  carries  a  higher  margi- 
nal  utility.  According  to  this  reasoning,  the  inflection  point  exp(p  -  a’) 
would  be  a prime  candidate  for  a definition  of  a poverty  line.  Indeed.  in 
related  research  on  poverty  (e.g..  Goedhart  et  al.  1977).  it  is found  that 
the  income  level  at  which  people  report  to  be  just  able  to  make  ends 
meet  is approximately  equal  to  exp(p  -  a’).  Hitherto,  this  phenomenon 
has  not  been  investigated  in  more  depth.  however. 
In  practice.  the  phenomenon  of  initially  increasing  marginal  utility  is 
of  minor  importance  as  it  turns  out  that  almost  all  observations 
correspond  to  the  concave  part  of  the  function  (most  people  are  able  to 
make  ends  meet),  thereby  maintaining  Gossen’s  first  Iaw  in  practice.  In 
the  context  of  utility  maximization  using  the  multivariate  lognormal 
function  (see  the  Iast  paragraph  of  section  2),  the  s-shape  does  not  pose 
problems  as  the  multivariate  lognormal  is  quasi-concave.  hence  the 
indifference  curves  are  convex  towards  the  origin  as  usual. 
One  of  the  major  features  of  the  theory  of  the  individual  wet fare 
function  is  the  possibility  to  mcasurc  PWFs  and  WFIs  directly  on  the 
basis  of  survey  questions.  As  PWFs  and  WFIs  are  determined  by  two 
parameters.  measuring  them  amounts  to  measuring  their  parameters. 
We  concentrate  on  a  description  of  the  measurement  of  WFls.  They 
are  measured  by  asking  respondents  to  a survey  of  the  so-called  /IKYNII~ 
Evallrcr~ion Questiort  (I EQ)  ( see  tabte  1)  [2].  The  labels  ‘excellent’, 
‘good’,  etc.  are  translated  into  numbers  between  zero  and  one  in  the 
following  simple  way.  Each  iabel  is supposed  to  ‘carve  out’  one  ninth  of 
the  [O.l)-interval;  thus,  ‘excellent’  corresponds  to  the  interval  (;,I], ‘good’  to  (S.C].  etc.  The  original  motivation  for  this  so-called  equal 
interval  assumption,  by  Van  Praag  (1971).  was  based  on  an  information 
maximization  argument.  which  was  later  generalized  by  Kapteyn  (1977). 
The  argument  is roughly  as  follows.  The  answers  to  the  income  evalua- 
tion  question  furnish  a  division  of  the  income  range  into  income 
brackets  [_Y~,  _r,),  [_r,.  +r2)  . . . . . [_Y,,.-_r,,+,). where  _r,,=O  and  l;l+r  =  ~10. 
The  division  differs  from  individual  to  individual.  but  certainly  the 
division  is not  given  in  a  random  way.  It  is not  unreasonable  to  assume 
that  the  individual  tries  to  inform  us  as  exactly  as  possible  about  his 
welfare  function.  He  attempts  to  maximize  the  information  value  of  his 
answer.  How  can  we define  the  information  value? 
Consider  the  answer  in  table  1. The  welfare  evaluation  of  an  income 
in  the  bracket  [25000.  30000).  labelled  ‘sufficient’.  is on  average 
$[ U(25.000)  +  U(30,000)]  =  U(_&).  (6) 
with  Jr,  defined  implicitly.  However,  we  cannot  say  that  all  income 
levels  in (25000,  30000)  arc  evaluated  by  U( js).  The  average  inaccuracy 
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NOW  The  money  unounts  snwred  (in  reman)  arc  the  responx  of  an  arbitrary  chosen  rsapmdcn~ 
ol  3  lY71  wrvey  in  The  Nsthcrlands. of  evaluating  the  income  levels  in  [ZSOOO,  30000)  by  r/(_v5)  may  be 
defined  as 
L;;[  U(y)  -  U(j5)j2dU(y). 
When  we  have  a partition  [O, yI),  [y,.  y2  ). . . . , [y,,, 00). the total average 
inaccuracy  of  this  partition  is defined  by 
k  /""[U(y)  - U(_?,)]‘dU(y). 
r=ll  .I 
Now  it  is evident  that  the  separate  integrals  increase  with  the  variation 
of  the  CI-function  on  [y,,  y,,,)  and  with  the  interval  length  (y,+,  -y,). 
Hence,  the  individual  selects  narrow  brackets  where  the  U-function  is 
steep.  and  wide  brackets  where  U  increases  slowly.  Mathematically.  the 
individual  attempts  to  choose  the  y,-values  in  such  a  way  that  (8)  is 
minimized.  It  is  a  matter  of  some  algebra  to  show  that  the  solution  is 
V(y,)=  i/(n  +  1). which  justifies  the  equal  interval  assumption. 
Until  recently,  the  procedure  was  untested  and  almost  all  measure- 
ments  of  WFIs  and  of  PWFs  have  been  based  on  this  assumption. 
Some  recent  tests  wcrc  carried  out  by  Buyze  (1982)  and  Antonides  et  al. 
(1980).  Buyzc  (1982)  builds  a  statistical  model  in  which  the  equal 
inlcrval  assumption  is  tested  by  means  of  an  analysis  of  variance 
technique  Her  conclusion  is  that  the  assumption  may  hold  true  ap- 
proximately,  but  not  exactly.  Antonides  et  al.  (1980)  come  to  a  similar 
conclusion  on  the  basis  of  a  direct  test  (set  below). 
Given  a  procedure  to  translate  the  labels  in  the  IEQ  into  numbers 
between  zero  and  one,  estimation  of  the  WFI-parameters  p  and  u  of 
the  individual  who  answered  the  IEQ  amounts  to  a  simple  problem  of 
curve  fitting.  As  one  sees  from  the  question,  generally  there  are  eight 
different  income  responses.  This  yields  a  scatter  of  eight  points  from 
which  this  individual’s  p  and  u  can  be  estimated.  By  plotting  the  eight 
points  on  lognormal  paper  the  s-shaped  scatter  turns  into  a  linear 
scatter  and  p  and  u  are  estimated  by  a  linear  regression  with  eight 
points.  The  estimation  method  is  very  simple  and  cheap  to  apply,  also 
in  large  scale  surveys.  For  results  of  this  method,  see  for  example  Van 
Praag  (1971).  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973),  Van  Herwaarden  et  al. 
(1977). Since  the  estimation  method  was  developed.  some  70,000  WFIs  have 
been  measured  for  individuals  in  ten  European  countries  and  the  U.S. 
In  addition.  about  11.000  PWFs  have  been  measured  in  two  surveys  in 
The  Netherlands  [3].  The  fit  of  the  regression  to  estimate  ~1 and  u  per 
individual  is.  on  average,  very  good.  The  typical  average  correlation 
coefficient  (unsquared  and  uncorrected  for  the  number  of  degrees  of 
freedom)  in  the  various  samples  equals  0.98  [4]. 
The  measurement  method  outlined  above  does  not  hinge  upon  the 
lognormality  of  the  WFIs  or  PWFs.  It  can  be  applied  equally  well  to 
other  functional  specifications  that  are  restricted  to  the  [O.l]-interval. 
This  allows  for  a  simple  test  of  the  lognormal  specification  vis-h-vis 
other  two-parameter  alternatives.  Such  a  test  has  been  performed  by 
Van  Herwaarden  .and  Kapteyn  (1981),  for  about  9,000  PWFs  and 
15.000  WFIs.  using  12  alternative  specifications  like  the  normal,  lo- 
gistic,  and  Weibull  distribution  functions.  and  the  logarithm  and  the 
straight  line,  both  truncated  from  above  and  below  to  restrict  their 
range  to  th<. [O.l]-interval.  It  appears  that  the  lognormal  and  logarith- 
mic  functions  outperform  the  other  ones.  The  logarithm  seems  to  fit 
slightly  better  than  the  lognormal.  Results  obtained  by  Antonides  et  al. 
(19X0)  suggest  that  this  may  be  due  to  the  equal  interval  assumption. 
These  authors  use  data  from  a  survey  in  which  rcspondcnts  have  been 
asked  to  attach  numerical  values  to  the  verbal  labels  used  in  the  income 
evaluation  question.  Thus,  they  can  investigate  the  validity  of  the  equal 
interval  assumption  directly.  It  turns  out  that  the  equal  interval  as- 
sumption  holds  true  approximately,  but  at  the  lower  end  of  the  scale 
the  equal  interval  assumption  attaches  numbers  to  the  verbal  lab&  that 
are  too  low.  As  a  result  the  graph  of  the  WFI  is somewhat  distorted  by 
the  assumption,  in  such  a  way  that  the  scatter  of  points  becomes  too 
concave.  Although  further  research  into  these  matters  is  certainly 
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[4]  See.  cg..  Van  tlcrwxudcn  IA  al.  (1977).  In  iUf  a  good  fir  is  not  surprising  since  the  rcportd 
income  Icvds  or  cxpcndi[ure  amounts  are  hound  IO  he  monotonous,  which  virrually  gunrantccs  ;I 
high  corrdation  cdficicnr.  Wicrcnga  (197X)  has  invesCg;lted  the  significance  of  the  correlation 
coefficient  by  simul;~Cng  pwudo-rcspondcnk,  whose  ‘answer>’  were  oh~ained  by  randomly  drawing 
from  3  rcc[angulx  distribution.  ttc  claims  that  the  random  Java  give  as  good  a  lit  as  rhs  red  &~a. 
In  3  rejoinder  (Van  t’wag  el  al.  197X)  iI  is  shown.  howcvcr.  Ihat  his  results  depend  crucially  on  the 
way  he  gencratcs  his  random  Dada.  nnd  that  LI  random  data  gcnera[ing  proccss  closer  in  tine  with 
the  Dada  x~ually  obxrved  gives  ;I  significanlly  worse  fit  than  the  real  dara. warranted,  for  the  moment  the  general  conclusion  may  be  drawn  that 
the  lognormal  provides  a  fairly  good  approximation  to  the  true  func- 
tional  form  of  WFIs  and  PWFs. 
The  method  described  to  measure  the  parameters  of  a utility  function 
is.  of  course,  unusual  in  economics.  where  measurement  usually  takes 
place  via  observed  behavior.  Kapteyn  et  al.  (1979)  discuss  the  difference 
between  both  measurement  methods  (direct  versus  indirect  measure- 
ment).  and  the  implications  of  this  difference  for  the  testing  of  models 
of  consumer  behavior. 
5.  A  theory  of  preference  formation 
Different  individuals  will  have  different  PWFs  for  the  same  commodity 
group.  In  this  section  we  discuss  a  theory  which  explains  the  formation 
of  individual  preferences,  developed  by  Kapteyn  (1977).  This  develop- 
ment  was  spawned  by  earlier  empirical  results  obtained  in  inter  alia 
Van  Praag  (1971).  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973)  and  Kapteyn  et  al. 
(1976).  Again,  our  exposition  is  sketchy  and  attempts  to  be  didactic 
rather  than  formally  correct.  We  once  more  focus  attention  on  the 
broadest  commodity  group,  income,  and  discuss  the  formation  of  an 
individual’s  WFI. 
Consider  one  of  the  N  individuals  in  a  society.  Let  us call  him  II.  By 
various  kinds  of  social  interaction.  he  is  likely  to  have  a  more  or  less 
exact  perception  of  the  incomes  in  society.  Probably  the  perception  is 
sclcctivs:  he  will  attach  much  weight  to  some  incomes,  like  those  of 
rclativcs.  colleagues  and  other  members  of  his  ‘peer  group’.  and  little 
weight  to  other  incomes,  like  those  of  individuals  with  a  different 
occupation,  a  different  education  level  and  3  different  geographical 
location. 
We  represent  this  subjective  perception  of  other  individuals’  incomes 
by  a  set  of  re1erejlc.e  \veiglzls  N;,~.  k  =  1,. . . , N.  These  weights  are 
assumed  to  be  non-negative  and  are  normalized  to  add  up  to  unity. 
Note  that  \t;,,,  is  one  of  the  reference  weights,  because  individuals 
evidently  also  perceive  their  own  income. 
We  define  individual  11’s perceived  cot~ten~porq*  itume  disrril~~rriot~ 
as  the  income  distribution  in  which  all  incomes  have  been  weighted  by 
these  reference  weights.  It  would  be  equal  to  the  actual  income  distri- 
bution  if  all  \+;,k would  be  equal,  i.e.,  H;,~ =  l/N;  then  individual  t? 
would  attach  the  same  importance  to  each  and  every  income  in  society. 
Intuitively.  this  seems  to  be  an  unlikely  occurrence. The  notion  of  a  perceived  contemporary  income  distribution  can  be 
clarified  by  a  simple  example.  Consider  a  society  consisting  of  three 
individuals  (n  =  1. 2.  3).  Let  the  reference  weights  and  incomes  be  as  in 
table  2;  so,  individual  1.  who  has  an  $8,000  income,  refers  for  50%  to 
individual  2.  and  for  the  remaining  50%  to  himself.  The  income  of 
individual  3 is irrelevant  for  him.  Individual  2.  who  is  in  the  middle  of 
the  income  distribution.  refers  to  individual  1 for  l/6  and  to  individual 
3  for  l/3.  The  weights  assigned  by  individual  3,  who  has  the  highest 
income,  are  given  in  the  last  line  of  the  table.  Note  that.  in  this 
example,  all  \t;,, ‘s  are  taken  to  be  the  same  (=  l/2).  Whether  or  not 
this  is true  is an  empirical  matter. 
The  three  perceived  contemporary  income  distributions  are  visual- 
ized  in  fig.  3a.  In  addition.  the  actual  income  distribution  is  also 
sketched  in  the  figure  as  a  dotted  line.  The  latter  distribution  is,  of 
course,  equal  to  a  perceived  contemporary  income  distribution  for  an 
individual  with  reference  weights  (l/3,  l/3.  l/3). 
The  graphs  depicted  in  fig.  3n are  step-functions.  To  aid  the  intuition 
behind  the  preference  formation  theory  to  be  introduced  below.  fig.  3b 
contains  an  adaptation  of  fig.  3a  for  the  situation  when  society  consists 
of  about  ten  individuals  rather  than  three.  Without  giving  a  dctuiled 
numerical  exaniplc.  it  is clear  that  the  various  distributions  will  now  bc 
rcprcsented  by  finer  step-functions.  (The  figure  only  depicts  the  pcr- 
ccivetl  contemporary  income  distribution  of  a subpopulation.  viz..  those 
of  individuals  I.  2 and  3,  plus  the  actual  distribution.)  The  final  step  is 
taken  in  fig.  3~:  the  number  of  individuals  in  society  is  now  so  Iargc 
that  optically  the  step-functions  have  become  smooth  curves. 
An  individual’s  perception  of  the  income  distribution  may  change 
over  time.  either  because  the  actual  income  distribution  changes  or 
bccausc  his  rcfcrencc  weights  change.  It  is  unlikely  that  when  a  IIZW 
contemporary  income  distribution  emerges,  the  individual  immediately 
forgets  the  previous  one.  Rather,  it  seems  plausible  that  previous 
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income  distributions  keep  lingering  in  his  memory.  To  clarify  the  issue. 
we  introduce  the  notion  of  time  a  little  more  formally.  Time  is  mea- 
sured  in  discrete  periods:  t =  0,  -  1.  -  2..  . . , where  t =  0  denotes  the 
present.  Any  individual  is  assumed  to  weigh  experiences  in  different 
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Fig.  3.  Actual  income  distribution  and  perceived  conbxnporary  income  dislributions. periods  by  nzemoq  weights.  a,,,.  a,._  ,,  L-I,,_,.  adding  up  to  unity. 
Presumably.  an,  is monotonically  increasing  in  1, as  recent  experiences 
will  be  perceived  stronger  than  experiences  longer  ago. 
Now.  we  can  introduce  the  concept  of  an  individual’s  overall  Per- 
ceived  Income  Distribution  (PID)  as  the  memory  weighted  sum  of  the 
perceived  contemporary  income  distributions  of  all  separate  periods. 
Thus  the  perceived  contemporary  income  distributions  are  building 
blocks  of  the  overall  perceived  income  distribution.  Casual  observation 
suggests  that  an  individual’s  WFI  will  be  related  to  his  PID.  In  fig.  3a. 
for  instance.  we  would  expect  individual  3’s WFI  to  be  located  more  to 
the  right  than  the  WFI  of  individual  1.  From  the  infinity  of  possible 
relations  between  the  WFI  and  the  PID.  Kapteyn  (1977.  1979)  has 
proposed  the  simplest  one.  His  theory  of  preference  formation  implies 
that  an  individual’s  WFI  is  ithticrrl  to  his  PID. 
One  of  the  basic  tenets  in  the  lognormal  framework  was  the  isornor- 
phism  between  a  WFI  and  a  probability  distribution  function.  and  now 
this  simile  has  been  extended  to  claim  that  a  WFI  is  actually  a 
perceived  income  distribution  function.  Analogously,  when  considering 
the  cxpcnditurcs  on  a  commodity  group  rather  than  income.  e.g., 
cxpenditurcs  on  cars,  the  theory  of  preference  formation  stntcs  that  the 
PWF  of  cars  is  iclcntical  to  the  pcrccivcd  distribution  of  cxpcnditurcs 
on  c’irc. 
AI  ‘implication  of  the  theory  is.  for  cxaniplc.  that  tin  individual 
whose  income  is  in  the  XOth pcrccntilc  of  his  pcrccivcd  inconic  distri- 
hution  will  cvnluatc  his  inconic  by  0.80,  an  individual  who  is in  the  60th 
pcrccntilc  will  cvaluatc  his  inconic  by  0.60,  etc.  ‘I‘lic  iclca  hchincl  the 
theory  of  prcfcrcncc  formation  is  almost  illlplilllSihly  siniplc.  Ijut  it 
appears  to  be  rich  in  its  possibilities  to  explain  social  and  economic 
phcnomcna  and  in  its  implications  for  empirical  rcscarch. 
Some  implications  of  the  preference  formation  theory  dsscrvc  attention. 
The  main  theme  of  the  theory  is  the  rclrltiritv  of  the  evaluation  of 
income  or,  in  the  case  of  a  I’WF.  of  expenditures  on  a certain  com~nocl- 
ity  group.  (In  the  latter  case.  the  theory  implies,  for  example,  that  I 
evaluate  my  car  by  0.80  if  my  car  is at  least  as  cxpcnsive  as  XOS of  the 
cars  in  my  reference  group.)  It  is  the  relative  position  in  the  incomc 
distribution  (or  distribution  of  cxpcnditures),  appropriately  rc:\veightcd, that  determines  the  individual’s  utility  level;  not  the  absolute  level  of  an 
individual’s  income. 
Reconsider  the  example  given  in  table  2.  According  to  the  theory. 
and  momentarily  ignoring  the  dynamic  aspect.  individual  1  evaluates 
his  income  by  0.50.  since  50%  of  the  population  (viz..  he  himself. 
subjectively  weighted)  has  an  income  smaller  than  or  equal  to  his  own 
income.  Individual  2  evaluates  his  income  by  0.67  ( =  l/6  +  l/2).  and 
individual  3  by  1 (=  l/S  +  3/S  +  l/2).  The  latter  individual  would  not 
very  much  appreciate  the  $8.000  income  that  individual  1 has:  he  would 
evaluate  that  by  approximately  0.13  (=  l/S).  Neither  bvould  he  be 
enthusiastic  about  the  idea  of  an  income  reduction  to  individual  2’s 
level:  he  evaluates  a $10,000  income  by  l/8  +  3/S  =  l/2. 
What  happens  when  individual  1  gets  his  income  increased  to 
$18,000?  From  table  2,  it  directly  follows  that  the  individuals’  evalua- 
tions  of  their  own  incomes  now  become  1.  l/2  and  7/S,  respectively. 
That  is,  individual  2  and  3  have  become  worse  off  due  to  individual  l’s 
incomc  incrcasc.  Their  welfare  losses.  however.  arc  not  very  dramatic  as 
each  of  them  attaches  a  low  weight  to  individual  l’s  income. 
Thcsc  numbers  arc  only  an  illustration  of  the  basic  points.  a  more 
complctc  discussion  being  postponed  to  later  sections.  What  they  do 
s11ggcst.  howcvcr,  is  the  importance  of  the  distributional  aspect  of 
incomc  (cxpcnditurc.  etc.)  evaluation.  The  prcfcrcncc  formation  theory 
is  rcminisccnt  of  a statcmcnt  by  Scitovsky  (lY76:  199):  ‘(W)hcn  pcoplc 
seek  stat1rs  ( . . . )  in  a  gcncral  token,  like  incomc,  ( . . . )  the  seeking  of 
status  bccomcs  a  zero  s11m  game’.  II!  and  Iargc.  the  prcfcrcncc  theory 
subscrihcs  to  this  point  of  view,  bc  it  that  the  sum  need  not  be  exactly 
zero,  dcpcnding  011  the  pattern  of  rcfcrcncc  weights  involved. 
The  relative  nature  of  evaluations  is  well  documented  in  the  soci- 
ol~)gy  and  psychology  literature.  This  is  not  the  place  to  rcvicw  that 
litcraturc.  A  number  of  instances  from  this  litcraturc  are  dealt  with  in 
Kaptcyn  :IIIC!  Wansbcck  (1982). 
Now  WC’ turn  to  a  discussion  of  the  more  formal  aspects  of  the 
prefcrcncc  formation  theory,  WFI  =  PID.  As  both  the  WFI  and  I’ID 
arc.  formally.  distribution  functions,  their  equality  implies  that  their 
log-moments  must  be  equal.  The  equality  of  their  first  log-moments 
(the  log-means)  can  bc  shown  to  imply  (XC.  e.g.,  Kaptcyn  1977,  1979): where  H;~ ,  is the  reference  weight  assigned  by  individual  II  to  individ- 
ual  k  at  time  t.  In  words.  (9)  states  that  an  individual’s  p  is a  weighted 
average  of  log-incomes.  the  weights  being  memory  weights.  N,,.  and 
reference  weights.  ‘c;I~.,. 
In  principle.  (9)  is  straightforward  to  test  by  means  of  a  regression 
type  of  analysis.  The  observed  dependent  variable  p,,  depends  linearly 
on  observable  explanatory  variables.  the  In!,,,.  This  idea  underlies  the 
empirical  work  to  be  described  below.  Before  that.  \ve  briefly  discuss 
two  extensions  of  the  simple  model  (9). 
Firstly.  the  development  so  far  has  been  in  terms  of  individuals 
rather  than  families,  and  especially  for  empirical  work  the  distinction  is 
important.  Let  /,,,  be  the  number  of  eqrirwlerrf  crti~rlrs  in  family  II  at 
time  t,  then  the  preference  formation  theory  can  be  reformulated  in 
terms  of  per  wpiftr  itmmc  (_r,,,/l,,).  This  implies  (after  some  algebra) 
that.  in (9).  ~_r,,  should  be  replaced  by  p,, -  In/,,  [5].  and  .)aA,  by  _rl,/fk,: 
see  Kapteyn  et  al.  (1950).  So  (9)  has  to  be  replaced  by 
(I,,,  f  “1,h.I  In/i,.  (10) 
I---n  h  .:  I  1--x  h-l 
Secondly.  the  quality  of  the  scconcl  log-nicxiicnts  of  the  WFI  and  the 
1’11) (the  log-variances)  irnplics.  an;~logous  to  (9): 
WC thus  obtain  a second  relation  hctwccn  obscrvabll:  quantities.  0,:  and 
(In.\*,, -CL,,)?  Also  tt  ”  11b  relation  can  bc  cxtcnclccl  to  account  for  family 
six  effects,  in  much  the  same  way  as  (9).  The  resulting  exuprcssion  is  ;I 
bit  more  complicated  than  ( IO)  and  will  not  bc  given  hcrc  (xc.  e.g., 
Kaptcyn  et  al.  1980).  The  above  analysis  also  applies  to  the  cnplanation 
of  I’WF  parameters.  The  paramcttxs  CL,,  and  u,,  then  rcfcr  to  the  PWF 
of  a commodity  group  under  consideration  and  .)‘A,  is the  amount  spent 
on  the  commodity  group  in  period  I  by  individual  k. 7.  Empirical  evidence 
Eqs.  (10)  and  (11)  (the  latter  after  adaptation  for  family  size  effects) 
show  how  the  preference  formation  theory  implies  relations  between 
observable  quantities.  After  adding  disturbance  terms  to  the  right-hand 
sides  of  (10)  and  (11).  one  obtains  a  system  of  two  regression  equations 
that  state  how  p”  and  a:  depend  on  In_s,,  and  Infk,,  with  k  running 
over  all  individuals  in  society,  and  t  running  over  all  time  periods  from 
minus  infinity  to  zero.  In  principle.  this  system  can  be  estimated  from 
panel  data.  Since  this  type  of  data  has  become  available  only  very 
recently.  no  testing  of  the  full  model  (10)  and  (11)  has  yet  been  carried 
out.  Rather.  pieces  of  the  model  have  been  estimated  on  the  basis  of 
various  data  sets.  Part  of  these  results  were  obtained  on  the  basis  of 
simpler  models  that  were  specified  before  the  preference  formation 
theory  was  formulated.  These  results  can  be  reinterpreted  in  terms  of 
(IO)-(1  1)  and  provide  evidence  for  the  theory’s  plausibility.  More 
recently.  models  have  been  specified  and  tested  that  are  explicitly 
dcrivcd  from  (10).  but  still  ignore  (1 1). 
In  this  section  vve sketch  SOIIIL‘  of  the  empirical  results  obtained.  The 
first  problem  dealt  with  is the  specification  of  /,,,.  Secondly,  we  look  at 
the  specification  of  the  rcfcrcncc  weights  N;,~.,. and  thirdly  at  (I,,,.  Most 
of  the  exposition  vvill again  take  place  in  terms  of  WFls,  but  at  the  end 
of  the  section  WC:  also  consider  PWFs. 
The  function  L,,  rcprcscnts  the  number  of  equivalent  adults  in  family  tf 
at  time  1.  Since  only  cross-section  data  have  bwn  available  until 
rcccntly.  we  shall  only  pay  attention  to  /,, =jl,,,.  i.e..  the  number  of 
equivalent  adults  in  family  II  at  the  time  the  data  were  collected.  The 
specification  of  j,,  amounts  to  the  construction  of  f~n~i~r~  c~cpiuu/~t~c~~~ 
scvdes,  a  problem  with  ;I  long  history;  sec.  e.g.,  Dcaton  and  Muellbauer 
(1980)  or  Pollak  and  Wales  (1982).  The  theory  developed  so  far  does 
not  give  guidance  as  to  the  specification  of  1,.  nor  dots  the  traditional 
literature.  A  possible  crude  specification  is 
In/;,  =  /3,,  +  /3,  Inky,,  .  (12) 
where  /Is,, is the  number  of  persons  in  family  TV.  The  main  advantage  of this  formulation  (used  in Van  Praag  (1971)  and  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn 
(1973))  is  its  simplicity.  In  Kapteyn  and  Van  Praag  (1976).  a  more 
sophisticated  specification  is  used  by  specifying  /Is,  as: 
fin  = 2  a,d4,),  (13) 
J’l 
where  the  summation  is  over  the  171  members  of  family,  a,  is  a  rank 
weight  assigned  to  the  j-th  family  member  (the  members  are  ranked  in 
order  of  decreasing  age)  and  g  is  a  monotonically  non-decreasing 
function  of  the  age,  I,,,.  of  the  j-th  family  member.  The  function  g 
contains  three  unknown  parameters,  (Y/ is  a  two-parameter  function  in 
j.  The  parameters  are  estimated  on  the  basis  of  a cross-section  of  about 
3,000  members  of  the  Dutch  Consumer  Union,  taken  in  1971.  to  which 
the  following  model  is applied: 
with  f,,  a random  disturbance  term  and  /Iv,, defined  by  (13).  Essentially, 
(14)  is obtained  from  (10)  by  omitting  all  terms  except  In/,,  (for  which 
the  right-hand  side  of  (12)  is  substituted),  and  lI,,\tj,,,,In_r,, (with  L~,,H;,,, 
rcplaccd  by &).  In  other  words,  all  variables  pertaining  to  the  past  or  to 
individuals  in  the  reference  group  are  omitted.  The  omitted  terms  are 
represented  by  err.  Presumably.  the  omitted  terms  correlate  with  In/s,, 
and  In_y,,,  which  introduces  specification  errors.  Kapteyn  and  Van 
Praag  (1976)  ignore  these  errors,  partly  because  the  preference  forma- 
tion  theory  had  not  been  formulated  yet  and  partly  because  the 
availability  of  cross-section  data  only  forced  the  omission  of  the  bulk  of 
the  terms  in  (IO)  anyhow.  These  specification  errors  detract  from  the 
validity  of  the  empirical  results.  However,  similar  specification  errors 
are  made  in  all  traditional  investigations  on  family  equivalence  scales 
based  on  demand  studies. 
The  key  empirical  findings  with  respect  to  (13)  are:  the  cost  of  family 
members  (i.e.,  their  contribution  to  the  total  number  of  equivalent 
adults  in  the  family)  decreases  sharply  with  their  rank  number  and  rises 
with  age  between  about  25  and  50  years.  Below  25  and  above  50  the 
cost  is  approximately  constant.  Estimation  of  (14)  on  the  basis  of  two 
Belgian  samples,  reported  in  Kapteyn  (1977)  yields  similar  results. 7.2.  Sociul  reference  groups 
In  order  to  do  more  justice  to  the  preference  formation  theory  as 
represented  by  (10)  and  (11).  one  has  to  model  the  reference  weights. 
The  specification  of  these  reference  weights  poses  the  thorniest  econo- 
metric  problem  in  the  estimation  of  (10)  and  (11).  The  main  problem  is 
that  there  are  too  many  of  them.  viz.,  N(  N  -  1)  for  each  t:  that  is.  N’ 
minus  N  as.  for  all  II.  L~_,~*;,L.,  =  1.  Evidently.  restrictions  are  needed 
to  be  able  to  estimate  the  reference  weights  al  all. 
Kapteyn  et  al.  (1976)  and  Van  Praag  et  al.  (1979)  set  out  to  estimate 
the  reference  weights  pertaining  to  year  zero.  I*;,~.,~ (abbreviated  to  b\;,L). 
in  (10)  and  (11).  omitting  all  terms  that  pertain  to  the  past.  They 
specify  the  H;,~  as  functions  of  the  similarity  in  social  characteristics  of 
individuals  II  and  X-. The  core  of  the  parametrization  is  the  introduction 
of  six  matrices  of  ‘partial  reference  weights’,  one  for  each  of  the  six 
characteristics  distinguished:  Education  (4  levels).  Sector  of  employ- 
ment  (government.  industry.  or  not  employed).  Job-type  (5  types), 
Degree  of  urbanization  (2  categories).  Age  (4  brackets)  and  Place  of 
residence  (wcstcrn  part  of  The  Netherlands.  remainder).  An  entry  in 
such  a  matrix  (the  (i,  ,j)-th.  say)  represents  the  average  weight  given  by 
an  individual  in  category  i  of  the  characteristic  concerned  to  an 
individual  in  category  j.  Weights  are  normalized  to  sum  to  1  per  row. 
The  overall  reference  weight  bt;,r(  is  expressed  as  a  function  ol  the 
product  of  the  six  partial  reference  weights  involved. 
Since  the  number  of  categcjrics  per  characteristic  is  4,  3.  5.  2,  4,  and 
2,  rcspcctivcly,  there  arc  in  principle  still  68  parameters  involved.  By 
further  parametrization.  this  number  was  rcduccd  to  26.  These  26 
parameters  have  been  estimated.  together  with  /3,,.  /I,  and  the  parame- 
ters  implicit  in  the  definition  of  /s,,. 
In  general.  it  appears  that  (i)  estimation  of  the  reference  weights  is 
possible,  although  complicated,  thereby  providing  the  first  empirical 
quantification  of  preference  interdependence  in  economics,  (ii)  the 
inclusion  of  ;I reference  group  term  yields  a significant  improvement  of 
the  explanation  of  p,  compared  to  the  model  (14),  (iii)  about  16%  ol  the 
variation  in  (7’  is  explained  by  the  reference  group  model. 
As  to  the  detailed  results  the  most  interesting  aspects  concern  the 
partial  reference  weight  matrices.  They  yield  insight  into  the  social 
process  of  ‘who  looks  at  whom’  when  evaluating  own  income.  So  it 
appears,  for  example,  that  individuals  give  no  weight  to  incomes  of other  individuals  whose  educational  attainment  is  lower;  individuals 
only  give  weight  to  incomes  of  others  of  the  same  or  higher  level  of 
education,  with  the  exception  of  those  with  only  primary  education: 
they  only  consider  ‘peer’  incomes.  As  to  age,  individuals  appear  to  refer 
to  individuals  of  at  most  the  same  age.  not  to  older  ones.  For  numerical 
values  and  for  results  on  the  other  four  characteristics,  the  reader  is 
referred  to  the  papers  mentioned  above. 
7.3.  Hubit  Jornwtion 
Recently,  panel  data  (the  first  two  years  of  a  longitudinal  study) 
collected  by  the  Netherlands  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  have  been 
used  by  Van  de  Stadt  et  al.  (1985)  to  estimate  (10).  ignoring  (11)  for 
reasons  of  simplicity.  This  neglect  inflicts  a  loss  of  efficiency  but 
introduces  no  specification  error.  They  assume  a  geometric  pattern  for 
the  CJ,,,  (i.e..  a,,,  =  (1 -  (~)a’).  The  reference  weights  have  been  mod- 
elled  a  lot  simpler  than  before:  only  three  characteristics  are  considered 
(education.  employment  status  and  age)  and  the  weights  H;,~ (k  f  n) 
can  only  take  on  two  values.  say  K and  y.  The  value  K  is  assumed  if 
individuals  II  and  ci  have  the  same  level  of  education.  the  same 
cmploymcnt  status  (self-employed,  employee  or  uneniploycd)  and  are 
in  the  same  age  bracket:  othcrwisc  \b;,k =  y.  Furthermore.  btl,,,, is  as- 
sumcd  to  be  the  same  for  ail  tt.  Thus,  rather  than  having  to  estimate  26 
parameters,  as  in  Kaptcyn  et  al.  (1976).  only  the  three  parameters  K.  y 
;I  I1 d  M;,  ,,  remain  to  be  cstimatcd.  Of  course,  the  assumptions  made  arc 
not  correct.  but  the  resulting  inaccuracy  is  modellcd  explicitly. 
The  geometric  specification  of  N,,, makes  it  possible  to  rewrite  (10)  in 
lagged  form,  so  that  one  obtains  a  relation  explaining  this  year’s  p,,  on 
the  basis  of  incomes  and  family  sizes  in  this  year  and  the  value  of  p,, 
one  year  ago.  Some  results  are  (standard  errors  in  parentheses):  Li  =  0.83 
(0.15),  G,,,,,  =  0.66  (0.19). 
The  estimate  for  w,,,,  indicates  that  an  individual’s  preferences  re- 
garding  income  are  about  half  as  much  influenced  by  the  incomes  in  his 
social  reference  group  (past  and  present)  than  by  his  own  (past  and 
present)  income.  The  value  of  ci  indicates  that  the  incomes  in  the 
previous  eight  years  (both  own  income  and  incomes  in  the  social 
reference  group)  determine  80%  of  the  individual’s  II,  i.e.,  (1 -  cr)( 1 +  (I 
+  . . . + (lh +  a’)  =  0.80,  if  u =  0.83. 
A  previous  study  (Kapteyn  et  al.  1980).  pertaining  to  holiday  ex- penditures  rather  than  income.  exhibited  a  lower  value  of  a  (ii  =  0.57) 
and  IV,,,,  (2””  =  0.13).  indicating  a  shorter  memory  span  and  a  higher 
degree  of  preference  interdependence.  These  differences  may  be  due  to 
the  differences  in  the  object  studied  (holiday  expenditures  are  very 
conspicuous),  but  may  also  be  due  to  the  larger  imprecision  of  the 
holiday  expenditures  results,  where  some  strong  assumptions  had  to  be 
made  in  order  to  estimate  a  dynamic  process  from  a  single  cross-sec- 
tion. 
7.4.  Further  euiderlce 
Rather  than  estimating  more  or  less  complicated  models,  one  can  also 
try  to  corroborate  or  refute  the  preference  formation  theory  on  the 
basis  of  qualitative  relationships.  We  shall  give  a  few  examples  relating 
to  WFIs. 
Since  a  WFI  is equal  to  a  perceived  income  distribution  function,  we 
predict  u’s  of  individuals  in  countries  with  a  relatively  unequal  income 
distribution  to  be  larger  than  in  countries  with  a  more  equal  distribu- 
tion.  This  prediction  is  borne  out  by  a  comparison  of  ten  European 
countries  (Van  Praag  et  al.  1980).  If  one’s  income  has  varied  a  lot  over 
time,  u,:  will  he  large.  according  to  (I  I).  Indeed.  it  turns  out  that 
individuals  with  widely  fluctuating  incomes  have  high  u’s  (Van 
f 1crwaarden  et  al.  1977).  Another  type  of  test  rests  on  an  analysis  of  the 
specification  error  that  is  introduced  if  one  estimates  a  relation  like 
(14).  It  can  bc  ~ndc:  plausible  that,  if  (9)  is  the  correct  expression 
explaining  CL.  the  estimate  of  pz  will  be  smaller  if  incomes  fluctuate 
more  over  time.  This  effect  is found  in  various  samples  (Kapteyn  1977). 
8. Sofiw  tiicoretical exercises 
After  having  discussed  empirical  evidence  to  support  the  preference 
formation  theory,  let  us  have  a  closer  look  at  some  of  its  implications. 
We  shall  discuss  these  implications  in  terms  of  WFIs,  the  exposition  for 
PWFs  being  analogous.  To  simplify  the  exposition,  it  is  convenient  to 
carry  out  the  analysis  in  terms  of  income  ‘per  equivalent  adult’,  or, 
what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  to  assume  that  all  families  in  society 
are  of  equal  size.  Moreover,  we  ignore  the  lags  implied  by  the  memory 
function,  i.e..  we  assume  that  each  change  in  preferences  due  to  a change  in  circumstances  takes  place  instantaneously.  (An  equivalent 
procedure  would  be  to  say  that  we  only  consider  long-term  effects.) 
Let  us  consider  what  happens  when  individual  n,  say.  gets  a  wage 
raise.  If  individual  n  is the  only  one  to  get  a  wage  raise,  we  expect  him 
to  be  better  off  after  the  raise.  because  he  will  attain  a  higher  relative 
position  in  his  perceived  income  distribution.  If.  however,  all  individu- 
als  in  society  get  the  same  percentage  raise.  nothing  happens  to  individ- 
ual  n’s  relative  position  in  the  income  distribution  and  he  will  evaluate 
his  new  income  by  the  same  number  as  his  old  income.  This  was 
already  indicated  in  section  6.  Employing  the  preference  formation 
theory,  the  welfare  effect  of  the  wage  raise  can  be  studied  in  some  more 
detail. 
Consider  fig.  4.  Let  curve  I  be  individual  n’s  WFI  before  the  raise. 
He  evaluates  his  income  _v, by  0.6  (point  A).  When  he  is  promised  a 
raise  to  _r,,  he  expects  to  evaluate  the  new  income  by  0.9  (point  B).  We 
call  this  his  C’X  ~nfc  evaluation  of  _v,,. If  he  actually  gets  the  raise  (and 
no  one  else  gets  a  raise),  (10)  implies  that  I_’  will  rise  and  the  WFI  will 
shift  to  the  dashed  line.  Thus,  e.r posf  the  new  income  is only  evaluated 
by  0.X (point  C).  This  evaluation  is  higher  than  the  evaluation  of  .v,, 
reflecting  the  fact  that  _Y,,  is higher  in  the  perceived  income  distribution 
than  y,  was.  But  it  is  not  as  high  as  was  nnticipatcd  e.r  rlnle.  This  is 












0 distribution  his  own  income  plays  a  prominent  role.  so  that  with  each 
change  of  his  income  the  perceived  income  distribution  shifts  as  well. 
If  everybody  else  {or  at  least  everyone  in  individual  U’S  reference 
group)  gets  the  same  percentage  increase  in  income,  (10)  implies  that  efi 
will  rise  by  that  percentage.  so  that  individual  II’S  WFI  shifts  to 
position  11.  Now  .vII  is  evaluated  by  0.6  (point  D).  equal  to  the 
evaluation  of  ,Y,  before  the  wage  increase.  As  indicated  above.  this 
stems  from  the  fact  that  individual  n’s  relative  position  in  his  perceived 
income  distribution  has  not  changed. 
There  is  a  slightly  different  way  to  look  at  the  same  phenomenon.  It 
is  a  well-known  property  of  the  normal  and  lognormal  distribution 
function  that 
N(ln~;  /.L*  a)  =  N(1n.Y -  p:  0.  a)  =  ii(j*/e“:  0,  u).  (15) 
(This  property  was  also  used  in  section  3.)  Hence,  for  a  given  u,  the 
welfare  evaluation  of  an  income  J  is  determined  entirely  by  the  ratio 
_k’/L .  L1  8“  Thus  if  individual  II’S income  increases  from  _I*,  to  .k*,, and  the 
WFI  shifts  from  position  I  to  position  Il.  then  the  cffcct  of  the  income 
incrcasc  is  ‘eaten  up’  by  an  equal  rciative  incrcasc  in  e”.  This  latter 
incroasc  consists  of  two  parts.  In  fig.  4  the  ratio  f:/*‘/f:‘G  represents  the 
proportion  that  is  catcn  up  by  a  shift  in  c”  due  to  a  change  in  the 
ii~~ti~~i~tL1~it.s  own  income.  The  ratio  kW/I;‘G  is the  proportion  eaten  up 
by  the  shift  in  c“  due:  to  the  incomc  incrcnsc  in  the  social  refercncc 
group.  The  rilti0  I:‘f:/  I:‘(;  has  hccn  c;lllcd  the  pr~‘JLwtu~  r/t-i/r rufc  (Van 
I’rxig  1971).  whcrcas  kG/  i:‘G  has  hcen  calfcrl  lhc  rq/iwtrc~c  driJ+f  rule 
(Kapteyn  1977).  The  empirical  results  quoted  in  section  7.3  suggest  that 
the  prcfcrcncc  drift  phcnomcnon  aid  the  rcfcrcnce  drift  phcnomcnon 
each  eat  up  about  one  half  of  an  xross  the  board 
. 
income  Increase. 
This  discussion  suggests  again  that  income  cvaluution  is  a  zero  sum 
game:  an  income  increase  for  one  individual  implies  a  welfare  level 
reduction  for  all  others  who  attach  a  positive  reference  weight  to  this 
individual.  Although  there  is  ample  evidence  that  by  and  large  the 
eval~i~~tion  of  income  is  entirely  relativistic  (cf..  e.g.,  Easterlin  1974; 
Duncan  1975).  there  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  income  evaluation  is 
not  entirely  a  zero  sum  game.  First  of  all,  the  pattern  of  reference 
weights  may  hc  such  that  at  least  some  individuafs  incomes  may  hc 
raised  without  thereby  lowering  the  income  evaluation  of  others.  This  is 
corroborated  in  Kapteyn  and  Van  Herwaarden  (1980).  bvho  use  previ- ously  estimated  reference  weights  (see  section  7.3).  and  find  that  the 
1971  incomes  in The  Netherlands  could  have  been  distributed  such  that 
average  welfare  would  have  improved.  Secondly.  the  dynamic  aspect  is 
ignored  by  assuming  instantaneous  adjustment.  When  it  is  recognized 
that  the  adjustment  is not  instantaneous  but  takes  a  number  of  years  to 
become  fully  effective,  overall  wage  raises  are  seen  to  have  a  short-term 
welfare  effect,  although  the  income  distribution  remains  unaffected.  It 
takes  some  time  before  each  individual’s  p  has  adapted  to  the  raise. 
eventually  erasing  the  welfare  effect. 
9.  Policy  applications 
Directly  measured  welfare  functions  are  not  only  convenient  vehicles  to 
investigate  certain  questions  in  positive  economics,  like  preference 
formation,  they  can  also  be  used  to  address  various  policy  questions.  To 
conclude.  we  briefly  indicate  a  number  of  policy  fields  where  the  IWF 
can  be  or  has  been  fruitfully  applied.  Considerations  of  space  rule  out  a 
more  extensive  exposition.  For  a  more  elaborate  discussion,  see 
Wansbcck  and  Kapteyn  (1983). 
A  family  equivalcncc  scale  measures  the  relative  cost  of  living  of 
families  of  different  composition  or,  in  our  earlier  terminology,  it 
measures  the  number  of  equivalent  adults  in  diffcrcnt  families.  The 
rclcvancc  of  such  nicasuremcnt  to  income  maintenance  policies  is 
obvious.  Within  our  framework,  this  measurement  is  straightforward: 
Find  a  reasonable  specification  of  /,,  and  apply  (10)  to  panel  data.  The 
research  discussed  in  section  7.1  is  an  instance  of  such  research.  In 
Kapteyn  and  Van  Praag  (1980)  the  differences  between  and  communal- 
itics  with  other.  more  traditional  methods  are  discussed. 
Two  approaches  to  the  problem  of  determining  a  poverty  line  have 
been  followed  in  the  framework  of  the  WFI:  One  is to  add  to  the  IEQ  a 
direct  question  as  to  the  minimum  income  a  respondent  feels  he  needs 
in  his  circumstances  to  make  ends  meet.  The  other  one  is to  assume  that politicians  are  willing  to  impose  a  certain  welfare  level  (0.5.  say)  as  a 
minimum  for  all  members  of  society  and  to  use  the  WFI  to  translate 
this  level  into  a  minimum  income  level,  differentiated  by  family  size 
(and  possibly  other  socio-economic  characteristics).  The  first  approach 
leads  to  a  new  intersubjective  definition  of  a  poverty  line,  cf.  Goedhart 
et  al.  (1977).  Kapteyn  and  Halberstadt  (1980).  Kapteyn  et  al.  (1985). 
Colasanto  et  al.  (1984).  Danziger  et  al.  (1984).  The  second  approach  is 
explored  in,  e.g.,  Goedhart  et  al.  (1977).  Van  Praag  et  al.  (1982a.  b), 
Hagenaars  and  Van  Praag  (1985).  The  latter  studies  are  based  on 
surveys  taken  in  the  member  countries  of  the  European  Community. 
9.2.  Optimtrl  income  redistribution 
A  brief  discussion  was  given  in  section  8.  A  more  extensive  analysis  of 
the  same  points  is provided  in  Kapteyn  (1977).  Van  Praag  (1977.  1978) 
uses  the  dependency  of  p,,  on  own  income  (cf.  (14))  to  have  another 
look  at  income  inequality.  Since  individuals  do  not  have  identical 
WFl’s.  a  certain  income  change  is  translated  into  different  welfare 
changes  by  different  people.  As  a  result,  income  inequality  is perceived 
differently  by  different  individuals  and  policy  mcasurcs  that  are  con- 
sidcrcd  egalitarian  by  sonic  may  bc  pcrccived  as  increasing  the  in- 
equality  of  incomes  by  others. 
In  ;I social  wolfarc  kind  of  setting  IWFS  can  bc  extended  to  apply  to 
various  l~els  of  government.  like  municipalities.  Van  Praag  and  Lint- 
hors1  (1976)  analyze  the  rcsponsc  to  a survey  of  Dutch  municipalitics  in 
which  officials  of  local  governments  answer  IEQ-type  of  questions 
pertaining  to  municipal  expenditures  in  a  number  of  fields.  Such  an 
analysis  may,  for  instance,  bc  used  to  design  an  optimal  (in  SOIW  sense) 
allocation  of  block  grants  to  local  governments. 
Dagenais  (1977)  describes  an  experimental  survey  where  a  bivariate 
IWF  is  measured,  pertaining  to  ‘income’  and  ‘air  quality’.  Such  infor- 
mation  can.  for  example,  be  used  to  assess  the  distributional  effects  of 
an  air  pollution  abatement  project. 10. Conclusion 
The  empirical  results  discussed  are  in  many  ways  preliminary.  Mainly 
due  to  data  limitations.  the  specification  and  estimation  of  the  various 
models  leave  something  to  be  desired.  That  applies  both  to  the  mea- 
surement  of  WFIs  and  to  the  various  relationships  between  their 
parameters  and  other  variables.  Still.  it  appears  that  some  questions 
posed  in  the  Introduction  can  be  answered  with  confidence.  Let  us 
mention  a  few  of  them. 
Economists’  retreat  to  ordinal  utility  does  not  appear  to  be  based  on 
strong  empirical  evidence.  since  WFIs  and  PWFs  turn  out  to  have 
cardinal  properties  (cf.  section  4). 
The  results  obtained  with  respect  to  the  preference  formation  theory 
suggest  that  at  the  very  least  a  cardinal,  individually  measurable  utility 
concept  substantially  facilitates  the  investigation  of  a  number  of  em- 
pirical  and  theoretical  problems.  In  addition,  new  light  is  shed  on  a 
number  of  policy  issues.  Remember,  for  example,  the  use  of  WFIs  to 
construct  family  income  equivalence  scales. 
The  preference  formation  theory.  which  is a  natural  extension  of  the 
probability-like  nature  of  the  individual  welfare  function,  should  have 
dramatic  implications  for  various  parts  of  ccononiic  theory  whcrc. 
hitherto,  utility  functions  arc  taken  as  constant  and  independent.  Sonic 
of  thcsc  implications  were  skctchcd  in  some  detail  by  Layard  (1980). 
1  litherto.  most  attention  has  been  dircctcd  towards  the  measurement 
and  explanation  of  IWFs.  No  attention  has  been  given  to  the  use  of 
WFls  and  I’WFs  as  predictors  of  behavior.  The  only  attempt  in  this 
direction  is  by  Kaptcyn  ct  al.  (1979)  were  cardinally  measured  IWFs 
have  been  used  to  test  alternative  behavioral  hypothcscs. 
Most  of  the  policy  issues  discussed  in  section  9  have  been  or  can  bc 
dealt  with  by  means  of  revealed  preference  approaches.  The  theoretical 
basis  for  these  approaches  is  given  by  utility  theory.  The  revealed 
preference  approach  is then  used  to  obtain  empirical  evidence  on  utility 
functions  and,  next,  to  base  policy  analysis  on  that.  We  feel  that  it  may 
be  equally  justified.  and  often  easier  to  implement,  to  measure  utility 
directly,  and  use  the  results  in  policy  analysis.  There  does  not  appear  to 
be  any  reason  why  indirectly  measured  utility  functions,  via  the  re- 
veaIed  preference  approach,  would  be  a  more  solid  base  for  policy  than 
directly  measured  utility  functions  like  IWFs  (Wansbeek  and  Kaptcyn 
1983).  Ideally.  of  course,  one  would  hope  that  both  modes  of  rneasurc- 
mcnt  Icad  to  the  same  conclusion. References 
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